Strategic Hostilities in Corporate Finance

Authorship:  Prof. Dr. M S S EL NAMAKI Dean, Victoria University, Switzerland. Dean (Retired) Maastricht School of Management, MSM, Netherlands.

Abstract

Hostility could drive strategic behavior. And corporate finance could provide an arena. Competitors, shareholders, credit raters or even governments could initiate the measure. Except for hostile takeovers, this hostile strategic behavior is seldom addressed within strategy frameworks. And is seldom related to a defensive profile or a repulsive strategic move. The following article is an attempt at identifying the premises and framework of this hostile strategic behavior within corporate finance. The article gives a definition to corporate finance related strategic hostile behavior, explores the motivations, lists the players, analyses the strategies and explores possible defenses. An integrative conceptual and operational model follows. The article is based on contemporary work on strategy as well as corporate finance. The conclusion, and the ensuing model, could have a far reaching applied value at both strategy formulation and corporate finance levels.

Full text available at: http://thescholedge.org/index.php/sijbpg/article/view/203
This article is published in the Scholedge International Journal of Business Policy & Governance Vol. 02, Issue 08 (2015).