

Human Development, Social Innovation, and Interdisciplinary Knowledge

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ABSTRACT

Human development, social innovation, and interdisciplinary knowledge form three distinct but deeply connected strands of scholarship and practice. Each has generated its own body of literature, its own institutional frameworks, and its own policy debates. Yet when examined together, they reveal something more than the sum of their parts. This paper argues that the relationship among these three constructs is not merely complementary but constitutive: advancing human development requires social innovation, and social innovation, in turn, depends on knowledge that crosses disciplinary boundaries. Drawing on conceptual analysis and a review of the relevant literature, the paper develops a framework showing how these three domains reinforce and condition one another. The argument has practical implications for how universities organize knowledge, how policymakers design social programs, and how development practitioners think about impact. Rather than treating human development, social innovation, and interdisciplinary thinking as separate agendas, scholars and practitioners would do well to recognize their mutual dependence and design research and practice initiatives accordingly.

Keywords: Human development, social innovation, capability approach, interdisciplinary research, social change

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, SOCIAL INNOVATION, AND INTERDISCIPLINARY KNOWLEDGE

The world's most persistent social problems tend to resist single-discipline solutions. Poverty, inequality, climate vulnerability, and poor health outcomes are not just economic failures or political failures or failures of individual behavior. They are all of these at once, which is why narrow, sector-specific responses so often fall short of what communities actually need.

Over the past four decades, three bodies of thought have developed in ways that might address this complexity. The human development tradition, associated above all with the economist Amartya Sen and with the Pakistani economist Mahbub ul Haq, shifted development discourse away from growth metrics toward what people are actually able to do and to be. Social innovation, as a field, has focused on new combinations of resources, relationships, and ideas that address social needs more effectively than existing approaches. And interdisciplinary knowledge production has questioned the value of rigid disciplinary silos, arguing that many important questions can only be answered by drawing on multiple fields at once.

Each of these traditions has matured considerably. The human development framework has generated the Human Development Index, influenced national policy in dozens of countries, and produced a substantial philosophical literature on capability and human freedom (Sen, 1999; Nussbaum, 2011). Social innovation has moved from a loosely defined concept to a reasonably well-theorized field, with recognized processes, institutions, and an emerging body of empirical work (Phills et al., 2008; Mulgan, 2006). Interdisciplinarity has been studied from historical, theoretical, and pedagogical angles (Klein, 1990; Moran, 2002), and universities have increasingly reorganized programs and institutes around it.

What is less explored is how these three traditions connect. This paper takes the position that they do not merely overlap at the margins but that each one requires the others to function well. A reading of human development that relies only on economics will miss important dimensions of social life. Social innovations that lack a coherent account of human well-being tend to drift toward outputs rather than outcomes. And interdisciplinary knowledge that is not grounded in practical human concerns risks becoming an end in itself.

The paper proceeds as follows. The second, third, and fourth sections review the core literature on human development, social innovation, and interdisciplinary knowledge, respectively. The fifth section proposes a conceptual framework linking the three domains. The sixth section discusses the implications of this framework for research and practice, and a conclusion follows.

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: BEYOND GDP

The shift from economic growth to human development as a goal of social policy is one of the more consequential reorientations in development thinking during the late twentieth century. For much of the postwar period, development was equated with rising gross domestic product per capita. Countries were ranked by income, and international aid was designed primarily to stimulate economic growth. Critics of this approach had existed for decades, but it was the work of Amartya Sen and Mahbub ul Haq in the late 1980s and early 1990s that gave the critique both institutional form and theoretical depth.

Sen's capability approach, developed across a series of books and papers, argued that income is at best an instrument for well-being, not well-being itself. What matters, Sen (1999) contended, is what people are free to do and to be: whether they can live a long and healthy life, acquire knowledge, participate in the political life of their community, and exercise genuine choice over how they live. These capabilities are the real currency of development, not the means by which some of them might be purchased. Development, on this view, is the expansion of human freedom, and any economic or social arrangement that restricts that freedom counts as a form of poverty regardless of how well it scores on income-based measures.

The United Nations Development Programme gave this framework institutional expression in 1990, when it published the first Human Development Report and introduced the Human Development Index (UNDP, 1990). The HDI combined life expectancy, educational attainment, and income into a single composite measure, deliberately displacing GDP per capita as the primary benchmark of national progress. It was a political as much as a scholarly move: ul Haq, who conceived the report, wanted a measure simple enough to attract media attention and robust enough to shift the terms of policy debate (Haq, 1995). The HDI has since been refined and extended, and the annual Human Development Reports have become one of the most widely read documents in international development.

Martha Nussbaum extended Sen's framework in a philosophically more systematic direction, drawing on Aristotelian ethics to develop a list of central human capabilities that she argued any just society must protect. These include life, bodily health, bodily integrity, the use of senses, imagination and thought, emotions, practical reason, affiliation with other human beings and other species, play, and control over one's political and material environment (Nussbaum, 2011). Where Sen deliberately kept the capability list open-ended to allow for democratic deliberation, Nussbaum argued that some capabilities have a universal character grounded in human dignity itself. This philosophical difference between Sen and Nussbaum has generated considerable debate within the human development literature, but for present purposes the more important point is what they share: the conviction that development is fundamentally about expanding what people can do and be, not about aggregate national income.

Alkire (2002) developed the operational side of the capability approach, examining how Sen's framework could guide the design of poverty reduction programs in practice. Her work showed that the

capability approach is not merely a philosophical position but a tool for practical analysis, one that asks different questions than conventional poverty measurement and therefore generates different answers. Where income-based poverty measurement asks how much people have, capability-based measurement asks what they can do. The two questions can yield quite different pictures of who is poor and why.

One further development in the human development literature deserves mention. Researchers have increasingly applied multidimensional poverty measurement to track the distribution of capability deprivations across and within countries, moving beyond the HDI's national-level aggregates. These efforts have revealed patterns of overlapping deprivation that income data alone would not capture, reinforcing the argument that development measurement needs to be as plural as the phenomenon it tracks. What this strand of the literature has not fully resolved is how the expansion of capabilities actually happens. The framework in Section 5 returns to this gap.

Several features of the human development tradition are worth noting for what follows. First, it is irreducibly plural: it insists that human well-being has multiple dimensions that cannot be collapsed into a single metric without distortion. Second, it is participatory in orientation: Sen in particular argued that the selection of relevant capabilities should emerge through public reasoning and democratic processes rather than being imposed by technocrats. Third, it is openly normative: it does not claim to be value-neutral but argues that some states of affairs are better than others because they expand or restrict what people can do and be. These three features have significant implications for how social innovation should be conceived.

SOCIAL INNOVATION: RETHINKING SOLUTIONS TO SOCIAL PROBLEMS

Social innovation is a field built around a practical question: when conventional institutions and markets fail to address important social needs, what kinds of interventions actually work? The term itself has been in circulation since at least the 1960s, but it attracted focused scholarly attention in the late 1990s and early 2000s, when researchers and practitioners began examining a wave of organizational experiments in civil society, public services, and hybrid business models.

Phills et al. (2008) offered one of the more precise definitions of the concept, describing social innovation as a novel solution to a social problem that is more effective, efficient, sustainable, or just than existing solutions and for which the value created accrues primarily to society as a whole rather than to private individuals. This definition does several things at once. It insists on novelty, which distinguishes social innovation from ordinary service delivery. It insists on effectiveness, which rules out novelty without impact. And it insists on social value, which distinguishes social innovation from commercial innovation where the primary beneficiary is the entrepreneur or investor.

Mulgan (2006) argued that social innovation is best understood as a process rather than as a product or a type of organization. The process moves through recognizable stages: identifying an unmet need or an ineffective response to an existing need; generating and testing ideas and proposals; prototyping and piloting promising approaches; scaling and diffusing what works; and eventually embedding the innovation into mainstream institutions or policies. This process model proved influential because it gave practitioners a vocabulary for describing what they were doing and a framework for identifying where they were in the innovation cycle, which in turn helped them think about what resources and relationships they needed at each stage.

Murray, Caulier-Grice, and Mulgan (2010) broadened the frame further, mapping the diverse organizational forms through which social innovation happens: grassroots movements, social enterprises, cooperatives, public sector reforms, and hybrid arrangements that blend elements of government, market, and civil society. Their work highlighted that social innovation is not the property of any single sector and

that the most durable innovations often involve reconfiguring relationships among sectors rather than simply creating a new organization within one of them. This cross-sector perspective matters because many of the most intractable social problems are precisely the ones that fall between sectors.

Nicholls and Murdock (2012) situated social innovation within a broader analysis of social entrepreneurship and market transformation, arguing that the most ambitious social innovations do not merely solve problems within existing institutional arrangements but challenge and reconfigure those arrangements themselves. This more structural reading connects social innovation to questions of power, resource distribution, and institutional change that are also central to the human development agenda. If capabilities are constrained by unjust institutions, then social innovation that ameliorates symptoms without addressing underlying constraints has limited long-term value.

Bason (2010) examined social innovation specifically within the public sector, arguing that government agencies are frequently capable of more creative problem-solving than they are given credit for, provided they change their internal cultures and adopt more open, experimental processes. His work challenged the assumption that innovation is primarily a private sector competence and reminded researchers that some of the most consequential social innovations in history, including universal health care systems and public education, came from within the state.

Two observations about social innovation are relevant here. First, despite the field's practical orientation, it has struggled to develop clear theories of change that specify how innovations produce social outcomes. Many accounts describe what social innovations look like and what processes they follow but are less precise about why some innovations produce lasting change while others do not. Human development theory, with its capability-centered account of what counts as progress, could provide some of this theoretical grounding. Second, social innovation research has drawn on sociology, management studies, political science, economics, and public administration. This multifield character makes it a natural candidate for interdisciplinary analysis, which is the subject of the next section.

INTERDISCIPLINARY KNOWLEDGE: CROSSING BOUNDARIES

The argument for interdisciplinary knowledge rests on a simple observation: important questions rarely respect disciplinary boundaries. Climate change is simultaneously a natural science problem, an economic problem, a political problem, and a cultural problem. So is urban poverty. So is public health. Academic disciplines organize knowledge efficiently, but they do so by drawing boundaries that exclude as much as they include, and those exclusions can matter enormously when the goal is understanding or addressing complex real-world phenomena.

Klein (1990) provided the most widely cited historical and theoretical account of interdisciplinarity in the English-language literature. She traced the concept from its roots in classical thought through the twentieth-century development of the modern research university, documenting repeated tensions between the push toward specialization that drives disciplinary knowledge and the pull toward integration that drives interdisciplinary work. She also distinguished between multidisciplinary, which involves drawing on multiple disciplines without genuinely integrating them; interdisciplinarity, which involves real integration across disciplines; and transdisciplinarity, which involves moving beyond academic disciplines altogether to engage with practitioners and communities outside the university. These distinctions matter because much work labeled as interdisciplinary is in practice closer to multidisciplinary, and genuine integration is far more demanding than simply referencing multiple fields.

Moran (2002) offered a more cultural reading of the same history, examining how interdisciplinarity has been imagined differently in different national and institutional contexts and how it has sometimes been used to legitimate institutional restructuring as much as to advance knowledge. His account served

as a useful corrective to the more celebratory interdisciplinarity literature, which can treat boundary-crossing as inherently virtuous without asking what boundaries are being crossed, by whom, and toward what end. The sociology of interdisciplinary knowledge is not merely an academic puzzle; it shapes the conditions under which interdisciplinary work can actually happen.

Repko and Szostak (2017) approached the question from a more practical angle, developing a detailed process model for interdisciplinary research. Their framework identifies a series of steps: defining the problem; identifying the relevant disciplines; conducting disciplinary research within each; identifying insights specific to each discipline; analyzing sources of conflict between disciplinary perspectives; creating or discovering common ground between disciplines; and integrating the resulting insights into a fuller, more unified understanding. This process model has been widely used in graduate training programs and in methodological discussions about how interdisciplinary research can be evaluated for rigor, which is a genuine challenge given that peer review systems remain largely organized around disciplinary standards.

Funtowicz and Ravetz (1993) made a related but distinct argument in their paper on post-normal science. They contended that for problems characterized by high decision stakes and high uncertainty, the methods of conventional science are inadequate. In such situations, quality control must be extended beyond the community of professional researchers to include all those affected by the decisions being made. This extended peer community includes practitioners, citizens, and other stakeholders who bring different forms of knowledge and different experiences to bear on complex problems. The argument connects directly to the participatory dimension of the human development framework and reinforces the case for knowledge production processes that do not restrict relevant expertise to credentialed academics.

The institutional obstacles to interdisciplinary research are not simply logistical. They reflect deeply embedded assumptions about what counts as knowledge, who produces it, and how quality is assessed. Tenure and promotion systems in most universities reward publication in high-ranking disciplinary journals, which means that researchers who invest heavily in interdisciplinary collaboration are doing so at some cost to the currency that their home institutions use to evaluate them. Until these incentive structures change, the rhetoric of interdisciplinarity in university strategic plans will not translate consistently into research practice. This is a governance problem as much as an intellectual one, and it requires governance solutions, not just intellectual ones.

Several tensions in the interdisciplinary literature deserve attention. The first is the tension between depth and breadth. Genuine expertise in a discipline requires years of training, and genuinely integrating knowledge across multiple disciplines is extraordinarily difficult. Critics have argued that much work labeled as interdisciplinary is in practice superficial engagement with other fields rather than genuine integration. The second tension is institutional. Universities are organized around disciplines for good reasons: they support the accumulation and transmission of knowledge, reward specialization, and provide stable career paths for scholars. Interdisciplinary work disrupts these structures and can penalize researchers who engage in it, particularly early-career scholars who have not yet established standing within a home discipline. Neither tension is fatal, but both mean that the case for interdisciplinarity needs to be made carefully and that the conditions for it to flourish require deliberate institutional design.

A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: THREE DOMAINS IN RELATION

It is worth saying something about what the framework does not claim. It is not an argument that human development, social innovation, and interdisciplinary knowledge together constitute a complete theory of social change. Social change is driven by forces that this framework does not directly address: economic structures, political power, historical contingency, culture, and technology, among others. The framework is narrower than that. Its claim is that within the space of intentional efforts to improve social conditions through knowledge production and institutional design, these three traditions are more productive when

they work together than when they work separately. That is a more modest claim, and it is one that can be tested against experience even if it cannot easily be tested against data.

The preceding sections have reviewed three bodies of literature that have largely developed in parallel. Human development scholars have been primarily economists and philosophers, social innovation researchers have come largely from management studies and policy science, and interdisciplinary theorists have worked mostly in higher education research and science studies. Their conversations have not overlapped as much as they should, and the absence of dialogue among them has been a real cost to each tradition.

The framework proposed here identifies three dyadic relationships among the domains and one central zone in which all three interact. Table 1 summarizes the relationships schematically before the paragraphs below describe each in turn.

Table 1. Relationships Among Human Development, Social Innovation, and Interdisciplinary Knowledge

Domain A	Domain B	Nature of Relationship
Human Development	Social Innovation	HD theory supplies the normative standard; social innovation supplies the theory of institutional change
Social Innovation	Interdisciplinary Knowledge	Complex innovation problems require multi-field knowledge; single-discipline framing generates incomplete solutions
Human Development	Interdisciplinary Knowledge	A capability-centered epistemology requires knowledge forms that cross natural science, social science, and humanities
<i>All Three Domains</i>	<i>Central Zone</i>	<i>Socially embedded, normatively grounded, institutionally creative knowledge practice</i>

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL INNOVATION

The relationship between human development and social innovation runs in both directions. Human development theory can inform social innovation by providing a normative standard against which social innovations can be evaluated. Rather than measuring success by narrow output metrics, a capability-based evaluation asks whether an innovation actually expands what people can do and be. This is a more demanding standard, but it is also a more honest one. An innovation that improves service delivery without changing the underlying distribution of capabilities is, in human development terms, less significant than one that creates new freedoms or removes existing constraints.

At the same time, social innovation enriches human development theory by providing a mechanism for social change that the capability approach often lacks. Sen (1999) argued at length that expanding capabilities requires removing what he called unfreedoms, the social, political, and economic constraints that prevent people from living as they choose. The capability approach is strong on describing those unfreedoms and their consequences. It is less detailed about the specific processes through which they can be removed. Social innovation research, with its attention to how new practices develop, spread, and become institutionalized, can help fill that gap. The two traditions need each other.

SOCIAL INNOVATION AND INTERDISCIPLINARY KNOWLEDGE

The relationship between social innovation and interdisciplinary knowledge is both epistemological and practical. Social innovation problems are inherently complex. Designing a program to reduce youth unemployment in a post-industrial city requires understanding labor markets (economics), adolescent psychology (developmental science), urban geography (planning), community organizing (sociology and political science), and the legal frameworks governing employment (law). No single discipline provides adequate tools for this task.

This is not merely a practical point about the need for diverse expertise. It is also a point about the kind of knowledge that can accurately represent the problem in the first place. A purely economic account of youth unemployment will see it as a supply-and-demand problem and will generate economic solutions, some of which will miss the psychological, geographical, or political dimensions entirely. Interdisciplinary framing does not guarantee better solutions, but it raises the probability that the problem is understood in a way adequate to its real complexity. In this sense, interdisciplinary knowledge is not a luxury for social innovation research but a methodological requirement.

INTERDISCIPLINARY KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

The relationship between interdisciplinary knowledge and human development connects how knowledge is produced to what it is for. If human development is about expanding what people can do and be, then knowledge production that serves this goal must be open to the full range of human capacities and experiences. A purely technical or economic approach to knowledge excludes whole dimensions of human life that matter for well-being: aesthetic experience, cultural identity, social relationships, and political participation. Interdisciplinary knowledge, because it crosses the lines between the natural sciences, social sciences, and humanities, is better placed to address this range.

Funtowicz and Ravetz's (1993) concept of the extended peer community is particularly relevant here. If communities most affected by social problems are treated as sources of data rather than as contributors to knowledge, then knowledge production reproduces the same hierarchies that human development theory aims to challenge. An epistemology that takes human development seriously must include as knowledge producers the people whose capabilities are at stake. This is a demanding requirement, but it is consistent with Sen's insistence on participatory public reasoning as the foundation for capability selection.

THE CENTRAL ZONE: WHERE ALL THREE DOMAINS MEET

The zone where all three domains overlap represents something qualitatively different from their pairwise intersections. When human development goals are pursued through social innovations informed by genuinely interdisciplinary knowledge, the result is a form of practice that is simultaneously empirically grounded, normatively coherent, and institutionally creative. This combination is uncommon, which is partly why the most ambitious social change initiatives are so difficult to design and sustain.

Several examples from practice illustrate the central zone, even if they have not been explicitly theorized as such. Participatory budgeting initiatives, which spread from Porto Alegre in Brazil to cities across the world since the 1990s, combine human development values (political participation, community control over resources), social innovation (a new institutional form for public decision-making), and interdisciplinary knowledge (drawing on political science, urban planning, economics, and community development). Community health worker programs in low-income settings similarly combine capability-based goals (health as a dimension of human flourishing) with institutional innovation (deploying locally rooted knowledge rather than imported expert knowledge) and multi-field methods (medicine,

anthropology, public health, and community organizing). These are offered as illustrations of the kind of work the framework describes rather than as proofs of its propositions.

IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH AND PRACTICE

The framework developed above has several implications for how researchers approach questions in this space and for how practitioners and policymakers design programs and institutions.

For researchers working on human development, the framework points toward deeper engagement with social innovation literature, particularly regarding theories of institutional change. The capability approach is well developed on specifying what good outcomes look like but less developed on explaining the mechanisms through which those outcomes are achieved in actual institutional settings. Social innovation research, with its attention to process, organizational form, and the scaling of effective practices, can address this gap. Collaboration between development economists and social innovation researchers, informed by interdisciplinary frameworks, could be productive in ways that work within a single discipline cannot be.

For social innovation researchers, the framework points toward a more explicit normative foundation. Much social innovation research evaluates programs against outputs and reach but is less clear about what ultimate outcomes it is trying to produce and why those outcomes matter from a justice standpoint. Grounding social innovation in a capability-based account of human development would not merely strengthen the field's evaluative framework; it would also provide a more compelling justification for the field's existence as a distinct area of inquiry rather than a subset of applied management studies.

For scholars working on interdisciplinarity, the framework suggests that the case for crossing disciplinary boundaries becomes considerably more compelling when it is connected to concrete human problems rather than argued in the abstract. Interdisciplinarity for its own sake is a weak justification in the face of institutional resistance and career risk. Interdisciplinarity in the service of expanding human capabilities and enabling effective social innovation is a stronger case, and it connects the epistemological argument for interdisciplinary work to the social justice motivations that drive the human development and social innovation traditions.

There is also a methodological implication worth spelling out. The framework suggests that research designs in this space should combine normative analysis (what counts as good outcomes for human development?) with organizational and institutional analysis (how do social innovations emerge and scale?) and epistemological analysis (what forms of knowledge are necessary and sufficient to understand and address the problem?). Very few research projects in any of the three traditions currently do all three. That is understandable given the practical demands of academic research, but it is also a limitation that the field would benefit from acknowledging and working around, through collaborative research designs if not always through individual projects.

For university administrators and funding agencies, the framework reinforces a message that many already know from experience but that institutional structures often make difficult to act on: effective responses to complex social problems require teams with diverse expertise, evaluative frameworks that ask about real changes in people's lives, and tolerance for the iterative, experimental learning that characterizes serious social innovation. Universities and funding bodies that are serious about contributing to human development need to create conditions under which interdisciplinary teams can form, function, and be held accountable for genuine outcomes rather than disciplinary publication metrics.

For policymakers and development practitioners, the framework has a more direct implication: the choice of evaluative framework shapes what gets counted as success and therefore what gets funded, scaled, and sustained. Programs evaluated only against delivery targets will tend to optimize for delivery

at the expense of what is actually delivered. Programs evaluated against capability outcomes are more likely to ask whether the people they serve are actually better able to live lives they have reason to value, which is a harder question but a more important one.

CONCLUSION

This paper has argued that human development, social innovation, and interdisciplinary knowledge are not three separate conversations but three parts of a single conversation about how societies can become more just, more capable, and more responsive to the real complexity of human life.

The human development tradition provides the normative compass: what counts as progress, whose capabilities matter, and why freedom is a better measure of development than income alone. The social innovation tradition provides the practical and institutional vocabulary: how new arrangements of actors, resources, and ideas can change what institutions do and how they do it. And the interdisciplinary tradition provides the epistemological foundation: the insistence that knowledge adequate to complex human problems must draw on multiple disciplines and multiple kinds of expertise.

None of these traditions is complete on its own. Human development theory needs better accounts of the mechanisms through which capabilities expand. Social innovation research needs a more coherent account of human well-being to anchor its evaluative frameworks. Interdisciplinary scholarship needs to connect its epistemological arguments to specific human concerns if it is to secure the institutional support it requires. Each tradition, in short, needs what the others can offer.

The practical task is designing institutions, programs, and research agendas that reflect this mutual dependence. That is a challenge spanning universities, policy agencies, civil society organizations, and funding bodies. It is, in the end, a challenge about institutional innovation as much as intellectual innovation, and that itself is a social innovation problem. The framework offered here does not resolve that challenge, but it is intended to make the challenge clearer and the case for addressing it more compelling.

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